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NOTES
Weapon of Mass Coercion: How eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. Eliminated the Threat of Coercive
Automatic Permanent Injunctive Relief and Restored
Balance to the American Patent System
I. Introduction
The American patent system’s success emanates from a symbiotic balance
between the incentive to invent and the need to protect intellectual property
that occurs when patent holders’ “right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling [their] invention”1 acts as a means “[t]o promote
the progress of science and [the] useful Arts.”2 This balance, however, is
destabilized by patent holders who exploit their patent rights, such as the right
to exclude, to protect questionable patents or stifle competition.3 The rapid
expansion of technology and the accompanying proliferation of patents that
began in the late 1990s facilitated the evolution of such a species of patent
holders, commonly known as “patent trolls” or “Non-Producing Entities”
(NPEs).4 Patent trolls “produce no products or services and have the sole
purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they own and winning
infringement lawsuits against others.”5 Patent trolls thrive by accusing others
of infringing their right to exclude and then threatening to pursue costly
litigation to enforce this right, often resulting in intimidated alleged infringers
licensing patents of questionable validity.6 Patent trolls’ coercive capabilities
increased exponentially as a result of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision in MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., which created a general rule
that in patent infringement cases “a permanent injunction will issue once
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, at Executive Summary 3 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/05/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“A failure to strike the appropriate balance
between competition and patent law and policy can harm innovation.”).
4. Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51, 51; see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 3, at 38 (“NPEs [Non-Practicing Entities] obtain and enforce patents
against other firms, but either have no product or do not create or sell a product that is
vulnerable to infringement countersuit by the company against which the patent is being
enforced.”); Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who Is a Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA
CONF. J. 159, 159 (2006)
5. Seidenberg, supra note 4, at 51.
6. See McMahon et al., supra note 4, at 160.
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infringement and validity have been adjudged.”7 This automatic permanent
injunction rule empowered patent holders to enforce the right to exclude as a
property right against infringers and to obtain categorical relief for
infringement. But, the rule did not provide for consideration of the nature or
extent of the infringement or the severe effects of permanent injunctive relief
on the infringing party and the public.8
On May 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals’ automatic permanent injunction rule in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., rectifying a detrimental imbalance in the American
patent system between the rights of patent holders and inventors.9 In rejecting
the automatic permanent injunction rule, the Court unanimously held that “the
traditional four-factor framework that governs the award of injunctive relief”
governs requests for injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.10 The Court
stated this traditional four-factor framework as a concise test, requiring a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to demonstrate: (1) an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate; (3) that, in
light of a balancing of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and, (4) that a permanent injunction is in the public’s
interest.11 By applying this four-factor test to requests for injunctive relief in
patent infringement cases, the eBay decision eliminated a dangerous automatic
permanent injunction rule that threatened to become a weapon of mass
coercion against alleged infringers in favor of the four-factor test that fosters
the symbiotic balance between the incentive to invent and the need to protect
intellectual property.12
Part II of this note surveys the historical application of the four-factor
framework to requests for injunctive relief. Part III follows with a summary
of the background, issue, holding, and concurring opinions of the eBay
7. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
8. Id.
9. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
10. Id. at 1841.
11. Id. at 1839.
12. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S.
334, 337-38 (1933); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21 & 35 U.S.C.), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also generally 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (“The several courts
having jurisdiction under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity . . . .”).
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decision. Part IV analyzes the eBay decision’s rationale for applying the
traditional four-factor framework to determine injunctive relief requests in
patent infringement cases. Part V reviews lower courts’ application of the
eBay decision on patent holders’ requests for permanent injunctions, including
a recently decided Oklahoma case. This note concludes in Part VI.
II. The Four-Factor Framework for Injunctive Relief
The eBay decision represented a course correction by the United States
Supreme Court in reaction to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc. that permanent injunctions would
automatically issue upon a finding of infringement of a valid patent.13 The
Supreme Court rejected this automatic permanent injunction rule as an
unjustified departure from historical practice of applying the equitable
principles of the four-factor framework to injunctive relief requests.14
Historically, federal courts have been reluctant to grant injunctive relief absent
a balancing of the parties’ interests, and have repeatedly refused to create new
categorical remedies without explicit congressional authority, refusing to do
so even in cases where a clear statutory violation occurred.15 Consistent with
this tradition, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied the traditional
framework to a request for injunctive relief in a patent infringement case more
than twenty years before the eBay decision.16 And, prior to the eBay decision,
the United States Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule favoring statutory
procedure over substantive policy because such rules fail to fulfill the purpose
of the underlying policy.17
A. City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co.: The FourFactor Framework Seventy Years Before the eBay Decision
In 1933, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co. applied the four equitybased principles that comprise the eBay decision’s four-factor test to decide
whether to grant W.S. Dickey Clay’s request for an injunction against the City
of Harrisonville for discharging sewage into a creek on the company’s land.18
In assessing the propriety of injunctive relief, the Court emphasized that

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

MercExchange, L.L.C., 410 F.3d at 1338.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839-40; see also W.S. Dickey, 289 U.S. at 337-38.
See Amoco, 480 U.S. 531; Weinberger, 456 U.S. 305; Roche, 733 F.2d 858.
Roche, 733 F.2d at 866.
Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544.
W.S. Dickey, 289 U.S. at 337-38.
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injunctive relief “is not a remedy which issues as of course,”19 a principle the
eBay decision affirmed by rejecting the automatic permanent injunction rule.20
The four-factor framework’s requirements that the plaintiff demonstrate an
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies available at law were
implied by the Court’s statement that “[w]here substantial redress can be
afforded by the payment of money . . . equitable relief may be denied . . . .”21
The Court’s analysis also included a balancing of the parties’ interests, holding
that when “an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly
disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be denied . . . .”22 Applying the
framework’s final factor, the Court considered injunctive relief’s effect on the
public, and held that when “an important public interest would be prejudiced,
the reasons for denying the injunction may be compelling.”23
The W.S. Dickey decision demonstrates that the eBay decision did not
fashion a new test, but was the product of more than seventy years of stare
decisis. The Court’s application of the four-factor framework in subsequent
cases demonstrated the framework’s applicability to injunctive relief analysis
in statutory violation cases.
B. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo: The Four-Factor Framework Applied
To a Statutory Violation
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court applied the four-factor framework
to a request for permanent injunctive relief for a statutory violation in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.24 The Court considered whether to grant a
permanent injunction to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico against the United
States Navy for violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.25
Echoing the W.S. Dickey decision, the Court emphasized that “an injunction
is an equitable remedy.”26 As in the eBay decision, the Court was presented
with a clear statutory violation justifying a permanent injunction, but the Court
again rejected the notion of an injunction as “a remedy which issues as of
course.”27
The Weinberger decision demonstrated the efficacy of applying the fourfactor framework to requests for injunctive relief for statutory violations,
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
W.S. Dickey, 289 U.S. at 338.
Id.
Id.
456 U.S. 305 (1982).
Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 311.
Id. (quoting W.S. Dickey, 289 U.S. at 337-38) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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providing the eBay decision with a template for applying the four-factor
framework to violations of patent holders’ statutory rights. From a great deal
of precedent, the Court distilled that the gatekeeper requirements for injunctive
relief have “always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal
remedies.”28 The Court clarified the framework’s third factor as a balancing
of “the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as
they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction.”29 The
Court’s fourth-factor analysis shifted focus beyond the litigants to “the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”30 Thus,
the Weinberger decision not only proved the applicability of the four-factor
framework to statutory violation-based injunctive relief cases, but also
provided precedent for rejecting categorical rules that limit the courts’
discretion to balance the interests of the parties and the public in such cases.31
The Weinberger decision preserved the primacy of the traditional fourfactor framework against challenges by modern categorical rules. The Court
refused to fashion new and untested remedies, and defended the application of
the four-factor framework as “practice with a background of several hundred
years of history” while emphasizing that it will “not lightly assume that
Congress has intended to depart from established principles.”32 Thus, the
Weinberger decision preserved the four-factor framework, and most
importantly, encouraged its future application to a similar request for
injunctive relief from a statutory violation in the eBay decision.
C. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.: The Four-Factor
Framework Applied in a Patent Infringement Case
In 1984, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the same court that later
created the automatic permanent injunction rule in MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay Inc., applied the four-factor framework to a request for permanent
injunctive relief in a patent infringement case.33 In Roche Products, Inc. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the court considered Roche Products’ request for
28. Id. at 312.
29. Id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 320; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
32. Id. at 313 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
33. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by
statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21 &
35 U.S.C.), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
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a permanent injunction against Bolar Pharmaceutical for infringing use of
Roche Products’ drug patent.34 In Roche, the court was presented with the
issue of whether Bolar Pharmaceutical had infringed Roche Products’ drug
patent by using Roche Products’ drug to conduct research related to obtaining
FDA approval for a generic version of the drug six months prior to the
expiration of the patent.35 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Bolar Pharmaceutical’s testing constituted infringement and that Roche
Products was entitled to a remedy.36 The court, however, followed precedent
established by the W.S. Dickey and Weinberger decisions and found
“[c]ounsel . . . mistaken in their apparent belief that once infringement is
established and adjudicated, an injunction must follow.”37
The Roche decision demonstrated the effectiveness of applying the
traditional four-factor framework to a request for permanent injunctive relief
in patent infringement cases. As it would in the MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay
Inc. decision, the court considered a request for injunctive relief for harmful
patent infringement, but could not ignore that the infringing activity produced
a great public benefit. Although the court recognized “that the economic
injury to Roche is, or is threatened to be, substantial,” it held that the Patent
Act’s Section 283 “clearly makes the issuance of an injunction
discretionary.”38 The court commenced its injunctive relief analysis with the
framework’s traditional third factor, and held that injunctive relief “depends
on the equities of the case.”39 In balancing the effects of injunctive relief on
the parties, the court considered that in patent cases there are “aspects . . . that
might make a tribunal reluctant to select . . . relief along the harsher side of the
possible scale.”40 The court then applied the framework’s fourth factor and
held that “public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure
the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases.”41 The court gave
substantial consideration to the adverse effects of permanent injunctive relief
in patent infringement cases, warning that a permanent injunction against
Bolar Pharmaceutical could result in “destruction of [] records of research and
tests that may embody information that would contribute to the health and

34. Id. at 860.
35. Id. at 860-61.
36. Id. at 865.
37. Id. at 866.
38. Id. at 865-66.
39. Id. at 865.
40. Id. at 866.
41. Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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happiness of the human race.”42 Finally, the court addressed the framework’s
gatekeeper requirements of irreparable injury and the inadequacy of remedies
at law, and held that “the district judge, before getting into the issue of
equitable relief, must determine if he can deal with the case by adequate
money damages.”43 If monetary damages are proper, the framework’s
gatekeeper requirements are not satisfied, and “the predicate for equitable
relief of a harsh, or even a mild, character is gone.”44
The Roche decision demonstrated the four-factor framework’s applicability
to injunctive relief requests in patent infringement cases more than twenty
years before the eBay decision declared it the proper test for such cases. In
applying the four-factor framework, the Roche decision refused to award
injunctive relief as a matter of course for patent infringement. Furthermore,
the Roche decision unambiguously affirmed the historical reluctance to depart
from tradition to create new forms of injunctive relief when it held that “if
Congress wants the federal courts to issue injunctions without regard to
historic equity principles, it is going to have to say so in explicit and even
shameless language . . . .”45
D. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell: The Four-Factor
Framework Applied in Place of a Categorical Rule Favoring Statutory
Procedure Over Substantive Policy
The eBay decision was not the first United States Supreme Court decision
to reject a categorical rule that mechanically enforced statutory procedure over
substantive policy. In 1987, the Court rejected such a rule issued by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell.46
In Amoco, the Court considered the propriety of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ preliminary injunction against Amoco’s petroleum exploration
activities allegedly in violation of Section 810 of the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).47 The Ninth Circuit presumed that an
irreparable injury had occurred as a result of the statutory violation.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit created a categorical rule that “injunctive
relief is the appropriate remedy for a violation of an environmental statute
absent rare or unusual circumstances.”48 As it would hold in the eBay decision
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 867.
46. 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987).
47. Id. at 534.
48. Id. at 541 (quoting People of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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regarding Section 283 of the Patent Act, the Court held that the statutory
procedure in Section 810 of ANILCA did not require issuance of injunctive
relief for violations and lacked a “clear indication . . . that Congress intended
to deny federal district courts their traditional equitable discretion” in
enforcing the statute.49
The Court applied the four-factor framework because “nothing []
distinguishe[d] [Weinberger] from the instant case.”50 The Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s categorical grant of injunctive relief because it departed from
the traditional use of the framework and “erroneously focused on the statutory
procedure rather than on the underlying substantive policy . . . .”51 The Court’s
rejection of a rule that mechanically enforced statutory procedure established
valuable precedent for the eBay decision.
III. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: Statement of the Case
A. Facts and Procedural History
Founded by Pierre Omidyar in 1995 as AuctionWeb, the Internet site eBay
achieved great success through its online auction system that permits private
individuals to sell goods to the highest bidder or at a fixed price.52
Additionally, eBay owned Half.com, a subsidiary that operated a Web site
specializing in instant sales of fixed-price goods.53 At the time of eBay’s
inception, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had yet to decide State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, in which it held that business
methods were patentable subject matter.54 This helps explain why eBay did
not patent its online business method at its inception, which later led to its
conflict with MercExchange.55 In 1998, the year of the State Street Bank
decision, MercExchange was granted several business method patent
applications, including a patent for an electronic market that allowed private
individuals to sell goods to other private individuals through use of an
electronic market, monitored by a central figure that would engender trust
among users.56
It is unlikely, however, that eBay was aware of
MercExchange’s online auction business method patent, because the United
States Patent and Trademark Office’s “practice of periodically publishing
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 5-10 (2002).
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See McMahon et al., supra note 4, at 163-64.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
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patent applications did not start until 2001 . . . .”57 Thus, “eBay had no means
of tailoring its operations around MercExchange’s pending claims.”58
Aware that eBay’s business methods likely infringed upon its patents,
MercExchange initially sought to license its electronic market patent to eBay
and Half.com, its regular practice in similar situations.59 When eBay and
MercExchange could not agree, MercExchange filed a patent infringement suit
against eBay and Half.com in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.60
At issue in the trial court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was the
eBay and Half.com websites’ feature that allowed customers to purchase items
listed on the web-sites for a fixed-price.61 MercExchange alleged that eBay
had infringed three patents for an electronic market controlled by a central
figure, in which participants could purchase items for a fixed-price.62 As part
of the remedies sought against eBay’s alleged infringement of the patents,
MercExchange sought a permanent injunction against eBay’s infringing
activity.63 After the trial, a jury found eBay and Half.com guilty of
infringement and awarded MercExchange $35 million in damages.64 After
several motions by the parties, the trial court denied MercExchange’s request
for a permanent injunction, concluding that “a plaintiff’s willingness to license
its patents and its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents would
be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable
harm if an injunction did not issue.”65
Consequently, MercExchange appealed the trial court’s ruling on the
permanent injunction to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.66 The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief
holding that “[b]ecause the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the
essence of the concept of property,’ the general rule is that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”67
57. McMahon et al., supra note 4, at 164.
58. Id.
59. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
60. Id.
61. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
62. Id. at 1325.
63. Id. at 1326.
64. Id.
65. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d
695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. MercExchange, L.L.C., 401 F.3d at 1338.
67. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir.
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eBay appealed the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ grant of a permanent
injunction, arguing that the appropriate standard for determining an award of
permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement cases is the traditional fourfactor framework.68 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the propriety of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ automatic
permanent injunction rule.69
B. The Court’s Opinion
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a general rule of awarding permanent injunctions upon a
finding of patent infringement was appropriate relief, and whether such a rule
adhered to “well established principles of equity . . . .”70 In an opinion written
by Justice Thomas, the Court unanimously holds that the traditional four-factor
test used by federal courts to determine requests for injunctive relief applies
to disputes arising under the Patent Act, and, thus, the Court vacated the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’ judgment.71 In its analysis, the Court found
that neither the trial court nor the appeals court properly applied the traditional
four-factor test used to determine a grant of injunctive relief.72 Consequently,
the Court vacated the Federal Circuit Court’s order, remanding the case to the
trial court to apply the appropriate test.73
C. Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence approves of the Court’s holding but
emphasizes historical practice in favor of granting injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases.74 Although the Roberts concurrence agrees that “historical
practice . . . does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a
general rule that such injunctions should issue,” nevertheless, it reminds the
Court that since “the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief
upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”75 Chief
Justice Roberts found this historical trend instructive, and advises lower courts
“discerning and applying” the four-factor test that “a page of history is worth

1989)).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1838.
Id. at 1838-39.
Id. at 1839.
Id. at 1838-39.
Id. at 1841.
Id.
Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id.
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a volume of logic.”76 The Roberts concurrence interprets the eBay decision as
a formal adoption of the four-factor framework in patent infringement cases,
and not as a new paradigm for lower courts deciding injunctive relief requests
in patent infringement cases.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, encourages a different application
of the eBay decision. The Kennedy concurrence focuses on current trends
undermining the American patent system’s purpose, particularly the
emergence of patent trolls and the harmful effects of their exploitation of
patent rights.77 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence distinguishes past practice from
the present context, stating that “[t]o the extent earlier cases establish a pattern
of granting an injunction against patent infringers almost as a matter of course,
this pattern simply illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts
then prevalent.”78 Kennedy again distinguishes past from present by noting
that, in the present context, courts must heed the “nature of the patent being
enforced and the economic function of the patent holder . . . quite unlike
earlier cases.”79
The Kennedy concurrence’s distinction between past and present emanates
from concern over the emergence of patent trolls. Kennedy aptly portrays the
patent trolls as “[a]n industry [that] has developed in which firms use patents
not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees.”80 Kennedy’s portrait of patent trolls does not include
those patent holders who prefer to license the intellectual property they
develop, but focuses on patent holders who seek to exploit “an injunction, and
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation . . . as a bargaining
tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice
the patent.”81 In response to such patent troll tactics, Kennedy recommends
legal damages as “sufficient to compensate for the infringement” in cases
“[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply
for undue leverage in negotiations” or when “an injunction may not serve the
public interest.”82
Kennedy’s instructions to lower courts applying the eBay decision advise
that particular consideration be given to “the burgeoning number of patents
76. Id. at 1842 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 1842 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal
significance in earlier times.”83 The Kennedy concurrence instructs the lower
courts that “[t]he potential vagueness and suspect validity” of this new class
of business method patents, MercExchange’s electronic market patents among
them, “may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.”84 The Kennedy
concurrence interprets the eBay decision as providing a practical framework
for lower courts to address current developments within the American patent
system, and not merely the formal adoption of a traditional framework to
patent infringement cases.
IV. Analysis of The eBay Decision
Far more than the formal adoption of a four-factor framework or a victory
for business technology developers, the eBay decision restores balance
between the patent systems’s twin goals of protecting intellectual property and
encouraging new invention. By preventing the coercive use of permanent
injunctive relief by opportunistic patent holders, the creativity and innovation
necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the American patent system is
further protected for the twenty-first century. Drawing upon historically
established principles of equity, the Court adopts a four-factor framework
suited for the task of modern patent disputes, harmonizes patent law remedies
with those provided for other forms of intellectual property, and reinforces the
principle that categorical rules favoring procedural enforcement of the law
should not trump the underlying substantive policy the rules are created to
promote.
A. Historical Precedent Guided the Court’s Decision
The eBay decision required the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether
a rule automatically granting permanent injunctive relief to patent holders was
a justified departure from traditional principles of equity practice in
determining whether to award such relief. In addressing the issue, the Court
adhered to a long, historical tradition of applying equitable principles to
determine the propriety of an award of injunctive relief, stating that
“[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
such relief.”85 The Court did not fashion a new standard, but drew upon

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1839.
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previous cases, such as the Weinberger, Roche, and Amoco,86 that had applied
the four-factor test to determine an award of permanent injunctive relief.
Just as in the Weinberger decision, the eBay decision balances competing
interests: MercExchange’s interests in protecting its intellectual property and
eBay’s interests in a fair injunctive relief standard.87 Similar to the Weinberger
decision, the issue in the eBay decision concerned the propriety of an
automatic permanent injunction rule that challenged the discretion of federal
courts to grant or withhold injunctive relief for violations of the Patent Act.88
As a result of the Weinberger decision’s similar facts and issues, the eBay
decision confidently adopts the same four-factor framework applied in
Weinberger as the proper test for requests for injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases.89
Although not binding precedent, the Roche decision provided the Court in
eBay with direct evidence of the four-factor framework’s applicability to
injunctive relief requests in patent infringement cases. The Federal Circuit’s
analysis in the Roche decision centered on the discretionary nature of
injunctive relief, as established by Section 283 of the Patent Act.90 In
exercising this discretion, the Federal Circuit applied the traditional four-factor
framework in considering the propriety of injunctive relief in the case.91
Presented with a similar injunctive relief decision in a patent infringement
case, the eBay decision adopts Roche’s focus on the Patent Act’s provisions
as the basis for the Court’s application of the four-factor framework to
injunctive relief requests in patent infringement cases, emphasizing that “the
Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions may issue in accordance with
the principles of equity.”92
The Court’s previous Amoco decision further supports the eBay decision’s
application of the four-factor framework. In the Amoco decision, the Court
rejected a categorical permanent injunction rule because the Ninth Circuit
86. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984), superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21 & 35 U.S.C.), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
87. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Roche, 733 F.2d at 865 (“Section 283, by its terms, clearly makes the issuance of an
injunction discretionary.”).
91. Id. at 865-67.
92. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007

618

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:605

“erroneously focused on the statutory procedure rather than on the underlying
substantive policy . . . .”93 The eBay decision rejects a similar rule because the
Federal Circuit’s ruling transformed injunctive relief decisions in patent
infringement cases from an act of discretion to a mechanical enforcement of
patent rights that did not advance the interests of the patent system.94
Although patent holders possess a statutory right to exclude, the eBay decision
states that “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for
violations of that right.”95 According to the Patent Act, the rights conferred by
patents do not guarantee injunctive relief but are “subject to . . . the provision
that injunctive relief may issue only in accordance with the principles of
equity.”96 Presented with similar facts and issues to the Amoco decision, the
eBay decision adopts the four-factor framework to a request for injunctive
relief because it promotes the underlying policies the Patent Act is designed
to effect.97
The eBay decision did not fashion a new test to apply to injunctive relief
requests in patent infringement cases because none was necessary. Similarities
presented between the facts and issues of the eBay decision and previous cases
allowed for and encouraged the application of the four-factor framework to
conduct the injunctive relief analysis.
B. The Proper Scope of Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases
In the eBay decision, the Court rejects the notion of automatic permanent
injunction rules because such rules exceed the proper remedies for
infringement as provided by Congress in the Patent Act. The Court’s analysis
of the Patent Act establishes that the four-factor framework’s “familiar
principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act”
because the Patent Act’s provisions limit the Court’s discretion to select a new
standard.98 The Court determined that the Patent Act’s provisions, particularly
Section 283, are delineated by Congress as the proper scope of remedies for
violations of patent rights.99 Thus, the Court rejected any invitation to create
an automatic permanent injunction because the Patent Act does not indicate
93. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541-45 (1987).
94. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. The Court rejected the categorical rules created by the trial
and appellate courts for failing to fairly consider the interests of both parties involved in a patent
infringement case. Id. at 1840-41.
95. Id. at 1840.
96. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 283) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 1839 (citing Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542).
98. Id. “[T]he Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions may issue in accordance with
the principles of equity.” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id.
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that “Congress intend[s] such a departure.”100 The Court in eBay was reluctant
to adopt remedies outside the proper scope of the Court’s authority and echoed
the Weinberger decision’s refusal to “lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles.”101 The Court also impliedly
adopted the Roche decision’s requirement that Congress “say so in explicit and
even shameless language” if it desires courts to abandon historical practice.102
C. Similar Analysis Applied to Injunctive Relief Requests in Copyright
Cases
The Court's four-factor injunctive relief analysis applied in the eBay
decision harmonized patent law with the injunctive relief standard applied to
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights.103 Copyrights and
patents are substantively similar because the public gives both in exchange
“for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals,
and [as an] incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.”104
These similarities extend to remedies where the Copyright Act, like the Patent
Act, does not provide any categorical remedies for infringement but defers to
the courts’ discretion to determine the necessity and propriety of injunctive
relief.105 Just as the Court “has consistently rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically
follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed,” the Court in eBay
rejects the trial and appellate courts’ invitation to replace the four-factor
framework with categorical rules alternatively favoring patent infringers and
patent holders.106
D. Restoring Balance in the American Patent System
The eBay decision stands as the most important patent law decision thus far
in the twenty-first century because it eliminates a dangerous automatic
permanent injunction rule that encouraged detrimental imbalance in the
American patent system. The automatic permanent injunction rule represented
100. Id.
101. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
102. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded
by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21 &
35 U.S.C.), as recognized in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
103. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
104. Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
105. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000)).
106. Id. at 1840-41.
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a potential weapon of mass coercion that empowered patent trolls to threaten
innovators and entrepreneurs who refused to enter into licensing agreements,
or who chose to challenge the patent trolls’ questionable patents, with the real
possibility that the patent troll would seek a potentially disastrous permanent
injunction that could cause loss of customers, profits, and market position.107
Armed with such immense bargaining power, patent trolls were often able to
protect questionable patents and stifle competition.108 The eBay decision not
only eliminates this potential weapon of mass coercion, but also reverses
trends in patent law favoring patent trolls that alarmed competition advocates
and parties engaged in innovation and invention.109 By reasserting that the
four-factor framework applies to injunctive relief requests in patent
infringement cases, the eBay decision drastically decreases the ease of
obtaining permanent injunctive relief, promising to greatly reduce the use of
coercive tactics to protect questionable patents that stifle competition.110
The balance achieved by the eBay decision also simultaneously protects the
rights of patent holders and the interests of innovators. In responding to the
threat to innovation posed by patent trolls, the Court did not weaken the right
of inventors and patent holders to protect and market their patented property.
The Court rebukes the trial court’s broad rule, which held “that a ‘plaintiff’s
willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of commercial activity in
practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder
would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.”111 The
Court’s rejection of the trial court’s categorical rule preserves the ability of

107. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839; NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,
1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Anthony Zeuli, eBay v. MercExchange, NAT’L L.J., June 26, 2006,
at 13; see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(explaining that NTP, Inc., employed the threat of a permanent injunction against Research in
Motion, providers of the popular BlackBerry service, leading Research in Motion to settle rather
than suffer the suspension of the BlackBerry service and the loss of customers and millions of
dollars in profits).
108. Zeuli, supra note 107, at 13.
109. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 6-7. “Large and small companies
are increasingly being subjected to litigation (or its threat) on the basis of questionable patents.”
Id. at 7 n.23 (quoting United States Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003:
Hearing on H.R. 1561 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Exec.
Dir., Am. Intellectual Property Ass’n), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:86267.wais.pdf).
110. Seidenberg, supra note 4, at 52.
111. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d
695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)).
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patent holders lacking the financial resources to practice their patents.112
Likewise, it allows those desiring to specialize in research and development,
such as universities, to do so without fear of automatically being denied proper
relief for infringement because they prefer to license rather than produce.113
In addition to preserving patent holders’ rights to protect their intellectual
property, the four-factor test permits innovators to challenge a patent holder’s
use of patent rights in a manner contrary to the patent system’s purpose of
benefiting the public. In contrast to an automatic permanent injunction rule
that would put the alleged infringer on the defensive to prove noninfringement or invalidity of the infringed patent, the four-factor test places the
burden on the plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction to prove that the alleged
infringer’s activities have caused an irreparable injury that can only be
addressed through an equitable remedy, such as a permanent injunction.114
The alleged infringer also has the benefits of a balancing of hardships that a
permanent injunction could place on the parties and the consideration of the
permanent injunction’s effect on the public’s interest.115
V. The eBay Decision’s Impact on Patent Holders’ Requests for Injunctive
Relief
The eBay decision has influenced lower courts to grant permanent
injunctions in favor of parties actively practicing their patents as opposed to
solely involved in licensing.116 Since the eBay decision, lower courts have
centered their injunctive relief analysis on the gatekeeper requirements of the
four-factor framework: irreparable injury and inadequacy of remedies at law.
Influenced by the Kennedy concurrence, the lower courts’ treatment of these
requirements has focused on pragmatic considerations, such as the quantity of
patent infringement within the alleged infringer’s products or processes, and
whether the infringing activity has resulted in loss of market share, profits, or
industry reputation.117 In applying the eBay test’s fourth factor, the lower
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1839.
115. Id.
116. Jonathan Muenkel & Eric Lee, The eBay Effect: Real Change or Status Quo?: An
Examination of Requests for Injunctive Relief in Patent Actions Since eBay v. MercExchange,
IPL NEWSLETTER, Fall 2006, at 14, 20-21, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/news
letter/iplfall06.pdf.
117. See Tivo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex.
2006); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5-6
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006
WL 2128851, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp.
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courts have especially considered the potential effects of injunctive relief on
those economically linked to the alleged infringer and on the general public.118
The gatekeeper requirements are at the forefront of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas’ application of the eBay
decision. The Eastern District of Texas is worthy of close study because the
court has been “a popular forum for patent infringement suits because of its
reputation for favoring plaintiffs . . . .”119 On June 14, 2006, the court refused
a request for injunctive relief in z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
because of z4 Technologies’ failure to demonstrate an irreparable harm and the
inadequacy of remedies at law.120 In the z4 Technologies decision, the Eastern
District of Texas was presented with z4 Technologies’ claim that several of
Microsoft’s software products infringed z4 Technologies’ product activation
technology patents.121 Microsoft’s infringing use of the product activation
technology was a small feature of its comprehensive software packages, such
as Windows XP and Microsoft Office.122 Detrimental to z4 Technologies’
claim of irreparable harm was the fact that Microsoft did not directly compete
by producing product activation software based upon its infringement of z4
Technologies’ patents.123 In applying the eBay test, the court was influenced
by Justice Kennedy’s instruction to consider the alleged infringer’s use of the
patented invention.124 Accordingly, the court held that Microsoft’s use of “the
infringing technology as a small component of its own software” did not
constitute an irreparable harm.125 Instead of injunctive relief, the court
awarded z4 Technologies monetary damages because Microsoft’s infringing
activity had not caused “lost profits, the loss of brand name recognition or the
loss of market share . . . .”126 Accounting for the publics’ interest in injunctive
relief cases, the court also held that injunctive relief would adversely affect the
“public’s undisputed and enormous reliance on these products” and that such
2d 437, 440-41 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
118. See Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6; z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 442-44.
119. Seidenberg, supra note 4, at 54.
120. z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41.
121. Id. at 438-39.
122. Id. at 440 (“Microsoft only uses the infringing technology as a small component of its
own software, and it is not likely that any consumer of Microsoft’s Windows or Office software
purchases these products for their product activation functionality.”).
123. Id. at 440-41.
124. Id. at 441.
125. Id. at 440. This follows the suggestion in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that “[w]hen
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce . . . legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement . . . .”
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
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potential negative consequences weighed against z4 Technologies’ request for
injunctive relief.127
The loss of market share and the effect of injunctive relief on parties outside
the litigation continued to inform the Eastern District of Texas’ injunctive
relief analysis in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.128 In the Paice decision,
the court was presented with Paice LLC’s claim that several of Toyota’s
popular hybrid vehicles infringed upon Paice LLC’s patents for hybrid vehicle
transmissions.129 In applying the eBay test, the court reiterated its analysis in
the z4 Technologies decision, heeding Justice Kennedy’s instruction to
consider the amount of infringing activity in the defendant’s product and the
propriety of monetary damages for parties specializing in licensing.130 In its
four-factor analysis, the court did not find that irreparable harm occurred
because Paice LLC failed to demonstrate that Toyota’s infringing activity
would cause the failure of its licensing practices, as the two did not compete
for market share because one specialized in licensing its technology and the
other in automobile manufacturing and sales.131 In balancing the effects of
injunctive relief on the parties, the court considered that the effects of a
permanent injunction often extend beyond the party enjoined to affect “not
only [d]efendants’ business but that of . . . dealers and suppliers.”132 The
public’s interest factored in the court’s analysis significantly as the court also
held that a grant of injunctive relief could have the negative impact of stifling
“[t]he burgeoning hybrid market . . . as the research and expense of bringing
[this] product line to market would be frustrated.”133
Finally, the Eastern District of Texas relied upon a showing of loss of
market share and injunctive relief’s effect on the public to grant permanent
injunctive relief in Tivo Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp.134 The Tivo
decision’s facts demonstrate the most likely circumstances in which courts
applying the eBay test will grant permanent injunctive relief for patent
infringement. In Tivo, the court considered Tivo’s request for injunctive relief
from EchoStar’s infringing manufacture and sale of digital video recorders that
contained identical technology to Tivo’s patented digital video recorders and
targeted an identical market of customers.135 In holding that Tivo suffered an
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 444.
No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
Id. at 666-67.
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irreparable harm, the court described EchoStar’s infringing digital video
recorders as directly competing with Tivo’s digital video recorders and that
“[l]oss of market share in this nascent market is a key consideration in finding
that [p]laintiff suffers irreparable harm . . . .”136 The court also held that,
absent a permanent injunction, an irreparable injury would occur because
EchoStar would be able to “shap[e] the market to [p]laintiff’s disadvantage,”
resulting in “long-term customer loss.”137 In protecting Tivo’s investment of
time and resources in developing digital video recording technology, the court
also upheld that such protection of patent rights from directly infringing
attacks is important because the “public has an interest in maintaining a strong
patent system.”138
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma also
relied upon proof of lost sales, lost market share, and damage to reputation
within the industry in holding that injunctive relief is warranted. On July 27,
2006, the court granted a permanent injunction in Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield
Services, Inc.139 In the Wald decision, the court considered Wald’s claim that
the defendants had willfully infringed Wald’s patents for a polymer stick used
to treat oil wells.140 The defendant’s infringement was based on the sale of
polymer sticks, called Poly Drill Sticks, that accomplished the same function
as the plaintiff’s patented product, and that were marketed to the same
customers needing to treat oil wells.141 The defendant’s infringing activity
posed a significant threat to the plaintiff’s patented product, as represented by
sales of 14,335 Poly Drill Sticks that occurred for more than a year after the
defendant learned of the plaintiff’s patent.142 Consequently, the court held that
a “permanent injunction [was] warranted” because, in addition to the lost sales
from defendant’s sale of infringing Poly Drill Sticks, the plaintiffs had
demonstrated “lost market share and the opportunity to maintain their
[product] as the industry standard.”143 The Wald decision emphasizes that
courts applying the eBay test favor granting injunctive relief to parties actively
practicing their patents.
The lower courts’ have focused their injunctive relief analysis on the eBay
test’s requirements of irreparable injury and inadequacy of remedies at law to
efficiently decide requests for injunctive relief. The lower courts have quickly
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
Id.
No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *5.
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adopted Justice Kennedy’s pragmatic approach to injunctive relief analysis,
requiring proof of loss of profits, diminished market share, or harm to
reputation within the industry to justify injunctive relief. This approach favors
parties actively practicing their patents.
VI. Conclusion
The eBay decision successfully restored balance to the American patent
system by applying the four-factor test that permits patent holders and
innovators to simultaneously promote their interests to achieve a fair result.
In applying the four-factor test, the eBay decision eliminated a potentially
coercive automatic permanent injunction rule that mechanically enforced
patent rights rather than enforcing such rights in order “to promote the
progress of science and useful Arts.”144
Jean Carlos Lopez

144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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